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I discuss the relationship between theoretical terms and measuring devices using a
very peculiar example from biomedical research: cancer transplantation models. I do so
through two complementary comparisons. I first show how a historical case study can
shed light on a similar case from contemporary biomedical research. But I also compare
both to a paradigmatic case of measurement in the physical sciences – thermometry –
which reveals some of the most relevant epistemological issues. The comparison offers
arguments for the recent debate on the operational definition of Cancer Stem Cells, and
thereby suggests the relevance of a comparative approach in the history and philosophy
of science.
As I argue in the first part of this paper, so-called xenograft “models” of cancer are often
used not as models in the traditional, analogical sense, but as measuring devices. This prompts
the question of what it is that they measure, and of the relationship they entertain with it. To
investigate these issues, I compare two cases of xenograft as measurements with the prototypical
example of a measuring device: the thermometer. I rely on the work by Hasok Chang on the
history and epistemology of thermometry (Chang, 2004). Behind the apparent simplicity of
thermometers lies a daunting epistemological problem, which he labels “the problem of nomic
measurement”: in a nutshell, there are a variety of thermometers giving inconsistent (not
linearly correlated) readings, and we would need to know already what temperature is in order
to know which one gives the right reading. I highlight some relevant similarities between his
history of thermometry and the examples I will present from cancer research. In both cases,
instruments and theories have a reciprocal stabilizing role: the instruments are at the same time
means subordinated to theoretical understanding, and theoretical terms are means of bridging
different instrumental and operational contexts. Finally, the comparison sheds some light on a
contemporary debate in cancer research.
In the first part of this paper, I present the instrumental role that organisms sometimes play
in biomedical research (section 1.1), and apply this concept to early xenograft models of cancer
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(section 1.2). I show how, in early xenograft experiments, transplantability was taken as a signal
for an abstract quantity. Ultimately, this attempt at the mutual stabilization of operational and
theoretical concepts failed. However, this failure may be informative for a similar attempt in
contemporary cancer research. In order to better understand the epistemological issues involved,
I review how the analogous problem was solved in the case of thermometry (section 2.1). I then
present the more recent use of xenograft as measurements in the Cancer Stem Cell Framework,
and the specific problem of establishing an operational definition (section 2.2). Finally, I show
how some insights from the thermometry example can be used to inform, and even take position
on, some of the issues relating to this problem (section 2.3).
1 Living instruments
1.1 The roles of laboratory animals in biomedical research
Animals have long been used in biological research aimed at learning about human biology, most
often acting as “a surrogate for a human being” (ILAR and NRC, 1998, p.10). It is this surrogacy
that has warranted calling them “models”. However in the life sciences there seems to have
been a conflation between this intensional meaning of the term and its coincidental extensional
meaning, so that organisms often used as models came to permanently bear that label. While
they are indeed often used as surrogates, this obscures a great variety of functions that organisms
actually play in research. For instance, organisms are often factories for materials, as was the
case in the first half of the 20th century when stocks of viruses were kept and grown in the
lab by serial infection of host animals (e.g. rabbits). Nowadays, plasmids are routinely used for
DNA cloning, and labs around the world still rely on the bleeding of mice (or rabbits, goats,
etc.) for the production of antibodies. Calling these animals “models” would be so far-fetched
as to rob the notion of any meaning.
Organisms can therefore have a variety of roles in biomedical research, which are not ex-
hausted by the notion of model. The examples that I will discuss here represent a particular
such function, which is that of measuring/detection device (which I will call the “instrumental”
role for reasons of convenience).
What I mean by instrumental role can be illustrated with a simple example: the Ascheim-
Zondek (A-Z) test for pregnancy invented in the 1920’s. In this test, mice are injected with
the urine of a female patient, and are dissected after two days. If the injection caused small
blood stains on the mouse’s ovarian follicles, then the patient is pregnant (Zondek, 1928). The
mouse, here, is not used as a replica of the patient, not least because the phenotype actually
being used by the test – the blood stains – are absent from the woman. Rather, it seems
justified to talk of a measuring (or at least detection) device, as the animal has the function
of detecting a signal in order to learn something about the woman. The mouse allows one to
detect, in the input, something that was otherwise unobservable.
One can distinguish several kinds of observational instruments, and in order to talk of a
measuring/detection device, there needs to be a kind of decoupling between the observable
output of the device (the signal) and what this allows us to infer in the target system: not all
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that is observable in the readout of an instrument is actually informative about the input. The
fact that there is, for instance, an air bubble in the column of mercury is known to be irrelevant
to the temperature one wishes to measure. Finally, the case of the A-Z test is not a measuring
device in a strict sense, for its output is binary – it is a detection device. A measuring device
should at least provide ordinal, if not quantitative, readouts. This implies that “measuring
locates the target in a theoretically constructed logical space” (van Fraassen, 2008, p.2), and
indeed I will be concerned here with this relationship between measuring devices on the one
hand, and the structure and reference points of this theoretical space on the other.
Elsewhere (Germain, ming), I characterize the instrumental role of organisms in detail,
and argue for its relevance in contemporary research. Here, I would like to pursue a slightly
different goal, namely to push the analogy to a comparison with the classical example of the
thermometer, in order to study the relation between these instruments and what it is that they
should measure. Throughout this paper, I will discuss cases of such “living instruments” which
are strikingly similar to the A-Z test, and yet still of high relevance in contemporary cancer
research: xenografts as measurements of tumorigenicity.
1.2 Xenograft experiments in early cancer research
Following the nomenclature of Snell (1964), a xenograft – or xenotransplantation – is a case
of tissue transplantation where the donor and recipient are of two different species. From the
end of the 19th to the middle of the 20th centuries, transplantation was of big interest to the
scientific community, and scientists attempted a disarraying diversity of transplant experiments.
This was especially common in the field of cancer, in an attempt to domesticate tumours to the
laboratory. Human tumours, if they were to be studied experimentally, needed to be studied
outside their host. Even in the case of animal tumours, scientists were confronted with the
simultaneous shortage of spontaneous tumours and inability to sustain a tumour beyond the
death of its host. Hence transplantation became (and still is today, although for different
reasons) among the most widespread ways of studying cancer in a lab.
There is some disagreement as to the first author to be credited with successful tumour
transplantation. Claims go back at least to 1889-1898 (Hanau, 1889; Mayet, 1902; Ewing,
1919)1, but were all strongly criticized – see for instance Hekzog (1902), who instead credited
the feat to Loeb (see also Loeb 1945). More recently, a historical review of chemotherapy
attributes the “first transplantable tumor systems in rodents” to Clowes in the early 1910’s
(DeVita and Chu, 2008, p.8643). The contention seems to hinge on what is stable enough
to constitute a “system”. Indeed, an important reason for the disagreement is that for a
long time, the criteria on which to evaluate a successful graft were unclear (see Loeb 1945,
chapter 12). In general, grafts lasted only for some time before resorbing under the pressure of
the host’s immune system (although, at that time, the explanation was that the foreign cells
lacked specific “foods” – it was not until Medawar’s work in the 1940’s that the immunological
1As a matter of fact, Novinski (1876) showed even earlier the successful transplantation of the canine
venereal tumour. However, because it was believed that a virus was transmitted, rather than the tumour itself,
Novinsky’s work was never interpreted as transplantation. It was only established recently that the tumour
itself, and not some infectious agent, is transmitted (Murgia et al., 2006).
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basis of rejection was firmly established). Therefore, a line had to be drawn somewhere to
distinguish cells that have successfully engrafted, albeit only temporarily, and cells that are
just “still there” from the injection. Some authors were already discussing histological criteria,
for instance vascularization, but for a long time there was no established way to make the
distinction. A related problem is that the injection caused an injury to the recipient that had
important risks of infections, which (either because of the inflammation or of the death it
brought) could easily pass for cancer.
The systematic, large-scale work of Loeb (especially from 1901 to 1910) was certainly of
central importance in the establishment of transplantation systems (Witkowski, 1983), but the
experiments were of limited success for a long time (see for instance Funk 1915). The main
improvement in this respect came from the discovery that some locations in the host (the brain,
the anterior chamber of the eye, etc) accepted grafts more readily. As grafts started to become
more efficient, and transplantation systems were tamed, the possibility appeared of using them
as tools for a variety of purposes.
The long established observation that only embryonic and cancer tissues were transplantable
across species (normal adult tissues “did not take”) lead to such instrumental uses. Some
scientists proposed that “transplantability constitute[s] a biological test for cancer” (Greene,
1948, p.1364). Greene suggested that the “study of the transplants allows a more precise
classification than is warranted from the morphologic features of the biopsy specimen” (ibidem).
He was explicitly proposing a diagnostic tool to replace what he considered to be a ‘coarse’ and
uninformed judgement of pathologists.
Importantly, transplantation was not simply believed to be a useful signal: if it was a good
signal, it was because it was signaling something, and therefore giving access to some invisible
differences between cancer cells:
“The fact that a biological quality as fundamental as the ability to grow in an alien
species differentiates morphologically identical tumors suggests that the tumors
must also differ in metabolic or biochemical constitution. It would seem important,
therefore, to distinguish tumors with respect to this property and to study the
different groups formed rather than to consider morphological similarity a proof of
constitutional identity.” (Greene, 1952, p.41)
The very idea of using transplantation as a test implied that transplantation made visible a dif-
ference that was already in the tissues. More importantly, transplantability was not understood
as binary: degrees of transplantability could be obtained either by resorting to statistics (the
proportion of cases where the transplant was successful) or by assessing the pace, duration,
and quality of the growth. Hence more than a tool to detect malignancy, transplantation was
a tool to measure it. Arguably, this quantity was not numerical in a strong sense, but it was
at least ordinal: by 1952, Green had ranked over one hundred tumours on the basis of their
transplantability.
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1.3 Inventing an abstract quantity
The key step I am interested in here is this invention of an abstract quantity to which transplan-
tation provided access. Some, following Loeb, took this abstract quantity to be the “growth
momentum”:
“Clinically, the growth momentum of a tumor, i.e., the rate of enlargement, in-
filtration, and metastasis, characterizes the degree of malignancy of a neoplasm.
It has been shown experimentally with animal tumors that growth momentum is
likewise one of the most important factors governing transplantability, particularly
heterologous transplantability. [...] Accordingly, the determination of heterologous
transplantability of a tumor would provide a measure of its growth momentum and,
hence, the degree of malignancy.” (Towbin, 1951, p.716)
To make the analogy plain, “growth momentum” was the unobservable value to be measured
(the equivalent of temperature), and the growth of the transplant was the signal (the equivalent
of the height of the mercury column). For some, transplantability was a proxy to “growth mo-
mentum”, for others it was a measurement of the “autonomy” of the tumours. In both cases,
these abstract quantities were already loaded with both conceptual content and experience.
Indeed, the notion of autonomy was already used to explain both developmental processes and
carcinogenesis (see for instance the work of Hugo Ribbert or John George Adami, where both
are explained as differential responses to “tissue tension”). Similarly, the notion of “growth
momentum”2 was central to Leo Loeb’s biology (Loeb, 1945). Loeb himself was using trans-
plantation as a measuring procedure, although his approach was more complex3 Importantly, in
both cases the abstract notion was used to explain a variety of phenomena, both natural and
artificial, both normal and pathological4.
Given the diversity of transplantation procedures (host species, site of transplantation, as-
sessment method, etc.), it should not come as a surprise that scientists produced different,
conflicting classifications. This prompts the question of which transplantation system correctly
tracks growth momentum (or the abstract quantity of choice). Here, we meet what has been
the core problem of classical thermometry: without a direct access to temperature, how can
one know which thermometer gives the right temperature?
2The notion seems to come from demographics, where it became especially popular in the 1920’s. Should
this have been Loeb’s inspiration, it would be yet another early example of what would become very recurrent
analogies between cancer and socio-economics: Bolshevik cells, anarchist cells, etc...
3Loeb considered his experiments to simultaneously measure different aspects of the phenomena which he
called “differentials” (Loeb, 1945). Although I believe that the present discussion could equally apply to his
work, the presence of multiple quantities in the same reading makes the matter less straightforward.
4Because it took cancer and physiology as variations of the same causes, this approach was part of what
Michel Morange called “the Regulatory Vision of cancer”, in which “cancer was conceived as a disease of
development.” (Morange, 1997, p.6)
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2 Measurement and theoretical terms
But these questions already make an important assumption. Why did there have to be a
single, true classification system – or, for that matter, a single, true temperature? Chang’s
“Ontological principle of single value”, which states that “a real physical property can have
no more than one definite value in a given situation.” (Chang, 2004, p.90), simply displaces
the question to why scientists believed that temperature was “a real physical property”. At
least part of the answer has to do with the fact that the notion of temperature already had
an entrenched ancestry. It built upon both a long philosophical tradition that had already pre-
conceptualized the notions of heat and “caloric”, and an immediate, daily-life experience of
variations in temperature5. Both of these loosely fitted the readings of thermometers, strongly
suggesting that all were related to a common quantity.
To some extent, similar arguments can be made in the case of malignancy. In the quote from
Towbin above, it is striking that the term “growth momentum” is associated to a disarraying
variety of phenomena which, obviously, could point in different directions. But it was sufficient
that they would align most of the time to postulate a common cause – after all, most scientific
laws are ceteris paribus.
Moreover, the clinical context of xenotransplantation experiments already provided a very
concrete notion of malignancy: the clinical outcomes of patients provided a grading of tumours.
In a sense, therefore, the clinical could be understood as the (de facto) unobservable to which
the instruments are giving access. In this context, transplantation experiments simply ought
to approximate clinical outcomes. Indeed, scientists tinkered their transplantation procedures
to approximate clinical knowledge6. Nevertheless, as will become obvious in the next section,
scientists did not go all the way in this direction. Two important reasons can be given for this.
The first, supported by the passage from Greene quoted above, is that they were not just after
a predictive system, but an explanatory, or at least exploratory one, enabling an investigation
of the “mechanisms of autonomy”(Greene, 1951, p.902). In this context, approximating the
clinical outcome has the value of highlighting departures from it, and therefore of stabilizing
these departures as objects of explanation.
A second reason is the lack of repeatability of what we might call the “clinical measurements”
of malignancy. Malignancy, understood as the ability for pathological, neoplastic growth, is a
relational property of cells. Indeed, cells can to some extent become malignant just because of
differences in the surrounding tissue (Bhowmick and Neilson, 2004). This means that although
each human tumour is associated to a medical history and clinical outcome, this history has
many determinants that are external to the cancer cells. These can be due to the exact
5As Chang writes: “human sensation serves as a prior standard for thermoscopes” (Chang, 2004, p.42)
6The test was used in some laboratories (Towbin, 1951), but its sensitivity was criticized. Hence in the
decades that followed, different methods were shown to make the hosts more receptive, including X-ray irradia-
tion, cortisone treatment, and thymectomy, but the most important advance was certainly the discovery, in the
early 1960’s, of the Nude mouse mutant. Aside from its famous absence of hair, the nude mouse is characterized
by its lack of a functional thymus and the corresponding massive reduction in T cells. As a consequence, it is
largely unable to mount an immune rejection of the foreign tissues. In fact, even normal tissues successfully
engrafted, but at that time Greene’s idea of transplantability as a test of cancer was already forgotten.
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site and micro-environment of the tumour, the patients’s constitution or genetic background,
treatment history, etc, so that the correlation between the nature of the cancer cells and
the medical outcome is messily statistical rather than deterministic. Nevertheless, experience
strongly suggested that among the factors of malignancy were differences that were intrinsic to
the cancer cells: hence the invention of abstract notions such as “growth momentum”. In the
absence of an independent mean to group tumours together (which transplantability was trying
to offer), this meant that in practice each clinical outcome was yet another poor approximation
of the tumour’s “intrinsic malignancy”. The invention of such an intrinsic property, because
it makes it transportable (transplantable), enables the phenomena to simultaneously become a
theoretical variable and an object of experimental study7.
To study cancer in a mouse, moreover in the highly artificial context of the laboratory, will
never be the same as to study it in patients. However, the invention of an abstract property to
which the measurement procedure would give imperfect access enabled the use of the mouse
system to study the human system. In other words, the abstract concept provided a bridge
between different material systems, by assuming that the material systems were simply two
imperfect operationalizations of the same thing.
An analogous issue is ubiquitous in Chang’s (2004) history of thermometry, although the
question is never explicitly addressed: why did scientists need an abstract concept of temper-
ature? Metallurgists were doing fine optimizing their furnaces with their solid thermometers,
and scientists were designing steam engines on the basis of air thermometers. The only prob-
lem with purely operational concepts is that they are unable to afford semantic expansion, and
therefore knowledge gained, say, at the casual temperature range could not be easily trans-
ferred to very high or very low temperatures. The concept of temperature, abstracted from any
operationalization, provided such a bridge.
2.1 Reaching a thermometry consensus
Hasok Chang’s history of thermometry (Chang, 2004) describes the many strategies with which
scientists tried to stabilize the concept of temperature, many of which have an analog in the
context of xenografts. For instance, a substantial part of the history of thermometry was aimed
at establishing (or unsettling) “fixed points”: the freezing point, melting point, boiling point,
blood temperature, the first night frost, etc., up to the temperature of the cellars of Paris’
Observatory (Id., p.10). The same could be said of xenograft experiments: Greene, Towbin,
Loeb and others spent considerable efforts establishing fixed points. The most obvious is the
inability of healthy differentiated tissue to grow, but more interestingly a variety of clinical
characteristics (e.g. whether the tumour was metastatic) were believed, in clinical experience,
to correlate with the abstract quantity. Chang’s tale of how the fixity of fixed points was
challenged, until fixed points had to be manufactured, would find many echoes here. But
for the purpose of this paper, it is more useful to go to a later episode of Chang’s history
7In fact, most of experimental biology is about turning context-sensitive features into capacities or stable
properties. Arguably, the stunning success of the strategies of decomposition and localization in biology (Bechtel
and Richardson, 1993) is partly due to the fact that these strategies simultaneously provide understanding of
the phenomena and constitute it as an epistemic thing (Rheinberger, 1997).
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and briefly look at how the scientific community finally settled on what is nowadays taken for
granted: absolute temperature.
In the end, most of the conundrum was solved when Thomson (Lord Kelvin) reasoned
that the establishment of an absolute temperature required “a theoretical relation expressing
temperature in terms of other general concepts”, and relied on “the little-known theory of heat
engines by the army engineer Sadi Carnot (1796-1832)” (Id., p.175).
“As Thomson was attempting to reduce temperature to a better established the-
oretical concept, the notion of mechanical effect (or, work) fitted the bill here.
A theoretical relation between heat and mechanical effect is precisely what was
provided by a theory of heat engines.” (Id., p.175)
The first step was therefore to postulate an abstract temperature as defined by its theoretical
(and quantitative) relationship with another abstract term, “work”, which was linked to op-
erational concepts through mechanics. Interestingly, the second step was then a “deliberate
conflation” of this absolute temperature and of the temperature given by any thermometer (air,
mercury, etc): physicists assumed that the thermometers gave imperfect readings of this ab-
stract quantity, and simply substituted one for the other in their formula (Id., p.214). Obviously,
the fit was not perfect, but discrepancies allowed scientists to recalibrate their instruments, and
engage in successive steps of approximation and recalibration which Chang characterized as
“epistemic iteration”: “point-by-point justification of each and every step is neither possible
nor necessary, what matters is that each stage leads on to the next one with some improve-
ment.” (Id., p.215). While such iterations need not necessarily converge, when they do it
vindicates both the instrument and the theoretical construction.
It is interesting to note that the theory provided both the motivation and the solution to the
problem: scientists investigated thermometry to build a theory of temperature, and yet is it the
theory which solved the problems of thermometry. There is no problem in this circularity: tools
and theories that are rightly articulated gradually stabilize each other. But it means that there
is considerable freedom in the starting point. Indeed, the theoretical relationship between work
and temperature was enabling a quantitative theory of heat and an explanation of thermometry,
therefore giving reasons to connect the different “operational temperatures”. But at the same
time, it provided ways of going from one thermometer to the other, therefore undermining the
need for “the right thermometer”.
2.2 Xenografts in the Cancer Stem Cell framework
Nowadays, saying that a tissue grows because of its growth momentum is as explanatory as
saying that opium makes one sleep because of its “vertu dormitive”. The situation was cer-
tainly different for scientists thinking within the theoretical context of Loeb (1945). Hence the
fact that the notion of the “growth momentum” of cancer tissues did not catch on is most
surely related to the demise of the notion in developmental biology. In any case, both growth
momentum or Greene’s “autonomy” lacked tractable relationship with other notions, and this
proved critical for the establishment of a theory-instrument articulation.
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From the 1960’s on, and especially until the 1990’s, cancer research was unified around a
different notion, dissociated from physiology: tumorigenicity. While the concept of tumorigenic-
ity would deserve a history of its own, it is an umbrella term gathering so many heterogeneous
meanings that its treatment would only distract from the present discussion. Instead, I would
like to discuss a more recent episode of xenograft experiments. Because it bears a strong
resemblance to the previous example, its analysis can benefit from the previous discussion.
At the turn of 2000’s, strong analogy between physiology and pathology resurfaced in can-
cer research under the form of the Cancer Stem Cell (CSC) hypothesis. I shall only briefly
summarize the CSC model here – for a more detailed discussion, see Blasimme et al. (2013);
Visvader and Lindeman (2012); Valent et al. (2012). Its core hypothesis is that cancer pro-
gression is driven by a small subpopulation of tumour cells with stem-cell-like properties. Like
in normal tissues, only these cells are capable of infinite replication, and they therefore fuel a
hierarchical tissue development. After the discovery that myeloid leukaemia followed such a
model, a whole research programme developed with the aim of identifying and isolating such
cells in other forms of cancer. The basic strategy is to divide the population in subpopulations
according to some markers (typically on the cell’s membrane, so that cells can be sorted through
antibody-based methods), and assess whether these subpopulations differed in terms of some
measurement. Once more, mice were recruited as measuring devices, and once more, a variety
of transplantation procedures resulted in conflicting measurements.
One of the best examples of this conflict is the controversy regarding melanoma stem cells.
In the field of melanoma research, scientists have proposed to speak of melanoma-initiating
cells (MIC) as an operational definition of CSC: MIC are cells which, when serially transplanted
into an immuno-deficient mouse, are able to produce tumours recapitulating the heterogeneity
of the original tumour. Strictly speaking, scientists are most often not measuring whether the
cells are able to produce tumours, but to what extent, and therefore the injected cells are not
said to be all CSC, but to be enriched in CSC.
A few years ago, Schatton et al. (2008) identified a sub-population of cells, ABCB5+ cells
(cells expressing the ABCB5 antigen at their surface) enriched in what they claimed to be
CSC. In order to test it against the operational definition of MIC, they transplanted ABCB5-
and ABCB5+ populations of cells from a human tumour into NOD/SCID immunodeficient
mice (“non-obese diabetic/severe combined immunodeficiency”) and looked at the tumour
progression. After 8 weeks, hardly any tumour grew in the first case, and the majority steadily
grew in the second. In other words, only a small proportion of tumour cells, strongly enriched
in the ABCB5+ population, were able to initiate and sustain new tumours. They published an
enthusiastic letter to nature which was heavily cited, and for a time it was proclaimed that CSC
had been identified in melanoma.
Some months later, Morrison’s lab (Quintana et al., 2008) published a paper attacking these
claims. The most important for the present discussion is that they tried the same experiments
with an even more immunocompromised mouse (the NOD/SCID Il2rd-/- mouse) and obtained
radically different results. Injecting single cells, they found that one out of four was able to
initiate palpable tumours, and trying a wide range of markers, they were not able to correlate this
with any signature. They therefore concluded that there was no proof yet that the CSC model
obtained in melanoma, and that experiments seeking tumour-initiating cells should beware of
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relevant differences between the tumour environment in the patient and in the mouse host.
The lesson, it seems, was that Schatton et al. (2008) had drawn a bad conclusion that was
due to the particular mouse model they used, which happened to be unrepresentative of the
human host. Quintana’s paper was (and still is) a big success, being cited even more than the
first, often as a methodological warning. Nevertheless, given how “unnatural” the dramatically
immunocompromised mice are, there is still considerable debate as to which is the best (see for
instance Civenni et al. 2011).
The mice, and in fact the whole experimental system, again acted as an instrument: they
transformed an unobservable, yet causally relevant difference, into a visible signal, thus revealing
this difference. But what difference exactly? Given the disagreements of two recipients, which
signal faithfully informs us about tumorigenicity or “CSC-ness”?
The question becomes even more acute if we consider the rest of the story. Slightly more
than a year after Quintana’s paper, Schatton et al. (2010) published a follow-up paper in
Cancer Research, apparently moving the topic: “Modulation of T-Cell Activation by Malignant
Melanoma Initiating Cells”. Taking the discrepancies between the two studies as a starting
point, they addressed the question of why the difference between the mouse strains – the
absence or presence of the interleukin-2 gamma receptor (Il2rg) – made such a difference to
the apparent role of ABCB5+ cells. It turned out that ABCB5+ cells seem to block or reduce
the proliferation of immune cells and the production of interleukin-2, thus modulating T-cell
activity. Obviously, in a mouse which anyway lacks such an activity (and, as a matter of fact,
that completely lacks interleukin-2 gamma receptors), one expects to find no difference between
the subpopulations of cells. But in a mouse that has such an activity, only cells that are able
to disrupt this mechanism can proliferate efficiently.
Assuming that ABCB5+ cells prove to also be more malignant in the case in humans, one
might argue that the first model (the least immunocompromised) was a better model. However,
Morrison’s group would probably point out that this malignancy is not due to the tumorigenicity
of the cells per se. But on what ground can one exclude phenomena as part or not of such an
abstract property? On closer inspection, which instrument is the best depends on what it is
that we wish to measure – in this context, on the understanding one has of tumorigenicity or
CSC-ness.
Tumorigenicity is the capacity to form tumours and sustain growth, but in the presence or
in the absence of an immune pressure? One the one hand, human tumours do not develop
“in the void”: cancer patients are seldom so immunodeficient, and immune response is an
important part of cancer development and of variability in outcomes. A notion of tumorigenicity
independent of this pressure seems to be an idealization that lacks practical relevance. On the
other hand, it seems scientifically worthwhile to isolate the different components influencing
the malignancy of cancer cells, so that we might want to exclude the effects of the immune
system: tumorigenicity is one thing, evasion of immune surveillance is another. The problem
with this reasoning is that many other causally relevant elements (many ways through which
some cells might be more tumorigenic than others) could also be excluded. Therefore, one can
legitimately ask why excluding this and not other causally relevant elements. The only reasoned
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answer one can provide has to be linked to the adoption of a theoretical framework8 – or what
one could call the “theoretical grounding” of operations or instruments.
2.3 CSC and theoretical grounding of operations
In the first paper that I briefly described in the previous section, Quintana et al. (2008) reduce
the CSC model to tumorigenicity: “the cancer stem-cell model has suggested that only small
subpopulations of cancer cells have tumorigenic potential” (Quintana et al., 2008, p.593).
There has been a general tendency, especially in the field of melanoma, to avoid the abstract
talk of CSC in favor of the operational talk of melanoma-initiating cells – or cells that initiate
melanoma when transplanted into an immuno-deficient mouse. Likewise, participants of the
2011 Working Conference on CSC have explicitly tried to split the conceptual and operational
meanings (Valent et al., 2012) in order to avoid a conflation of the two. However, severing
the connection between the two is equally problematic. An exclusive focus on tumour-initiating
potential would be like a focus on the height of the mercury column: while it might be useful
locally, it does not allow semantic extension. The abstract concept does. The CSC framework
can potentially mediate between the material contexts. But this means that the problem of
selecting the “right” xenograft model can only be solved if one has at least a tentative theoretical
understanding of what the instrument should measure.
I believe the CSC framework can succeed where the notion of growth momentum has failed
precisely because its meaning has theoretical implications which are not reducible to the op-
erational definition of CSC. The seminal findings of Bonnet and Dick (1997) was not that
some leukemic cells were more tumorigenic than others, but precisely that those were the cells
possessing stem-cell like characteristics (“the differentiative and proliferative capacities and the
potential for self-renewal” Bonnet and Dick 1997, p.730). In doing so, it established a paral-
lel between cancer and normal development, suggesting that the physiological differentiation
hierarchy can shed light on the dynamics of cancer. In other words, it also poses additional
constraints as to the kind of measurements that ought to be linked to it. Schatton’s findings of
the modulation of T-cell activity by cancer cells may be extremely relevant for an understanding
of cancer, but it has no physiological counterpart and is unrelated to the tissue hierarchy. As
such, it is irrelevant to the identification of CSC. It is not biologically or clinically irrelavant, but
irrelevant to what it is that the xenograft was supposed to measure. Insofar as the xenografts
are used for the identification of CSC, the question of the “right” assay can only be answered
with respect to the theoretical meaning of CSC: beyond its operationalizations and with full
attention to the theoretical relationships it entertains.
3 Conclusion
There are several differences between thermometry and xenografting, or between thermody-
namics and the CSC framework. The fact that physics is quantitative is perhaps the most
8See also Griesemer (1992) for discussion of how the appropriateness of a tool is necessarily linked to the
adoption of a theoretical framework.
11
important one: ordinal measurements of growth momentum were not quantitative in the sense
that they allowed no meaningful arithmetic operation between measurement results. Neverthe-
less, as I have tried to show, there are important similarities in the epistemological problems
encountered, and the comparison can yield insights into the current problem of the choice of
xenograft host. But I would now like to conclude with more general observations.
The comparison reveals that Chang’s notion of “epistemic iteration” is not limited to quan-
titative cases. Instruments are often represented as sorting devices from which emerge clas-
sifications of reality (see for instance Buchwald 1992). At the same time, entertaining the
full multiplicity of instruments (or procedures), and hence of competing classifications, would
be counter-productive. What I have tried to highlight is that theoretical frameworks, however
preliminary or vague they are, are needed to restrict this plurality. The first step is to assume an
identity between an operational concept and a theoretical concept, and the importance of such
bootstrapping assumptions was also emphasized in other fields such as experimental psychology
(Sullivan, 2008; Feest, 2010). From that point on, the process is one of gradual correction of
both terms to resolve inconsistencies. In the case of xenograft experiments, the use of increas-
ingly immunodeficient mice, or of humanized mice (Maugeri and Blasimme, 2011), are gradual
corrections of this kind. What I have been trying to emphasize, however, is that a lack of
convergence is not a failure of the instrument: it is a failure of the whole articulation between
instrument and theory.
Until a theoretical framework has been shown to be satisfactory, there is neither an epistemic
ground nor even a reasonable motivation for operational monism. And once the theoretical
framework is complete, such as in the case of thermodynamics, there is no more the need for
operational monism – for the “true” temperature, since the values of one thermometer can be
converted to those of another. It is in between these two moments that theoretical terms are
the most productive. It is precisely because they are operationally vague, but not as vague
as to defy transposition (we could say that they are operationally suggestive) that they allow
mediation between material contexts. Yet to avoid a trivializing flexibility, their meaning has to
be restricted through relations to other theoretical terms.
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